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 2 
Introduction 
What impact will September 11 have on the future of humanitarian 
intervention?  For liberals like Michael Ignatieff, the worry is that the 
„war against terrorism‟ is trumping human rights concerns in U.S. 
foreign policy.2  Rather than promoting human rights, the U.S. is 
aligning itself with repressive governments that support its counter-
terrorist policies.  This strategy is a 21st century replay of the Cold War 
when the need to secure allies against Soviet communism led the U.S. 
to support dictators all round the world.  The considerable softening of 
the American position on Russia‟s human rights violations in Chechyna 
in return for its support in the war against terrorism is one of the many 
examples of this shift in priorities.3   
The marginal role accorded human rights under President George 
W. Bush is a disturbing development, but it would be wrong to imply 
that this marks a decisive break with past U.S. policy.  Whatever the 
rhetoric of the Clinton administration, it didn‟t strongly advance human 
rights and humanitarian intervention in its foreign policy.  Indeed, what 
is striking in the area of humanitarian intervention is the similarity 
between the position taken by Clinton and his successor. During the 
election campaign, Bush and Democratic challenger Albert Gore 
publicly endorsed Clinton‟s decision not to send U.S. troops to Rwanda 
to stop the genocide in 1994.4  It is virtually inconceivable that the 
                                               
2
 Michael Ignatieff, „Is the human rights era ending.” New York Times, 5 February 2002.  For 
a less pessimistic view, see Tim Dunne, „After 9/11: What next for human rights‟, 
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.6, No.2 (forthcoming Summer 2002). 
3
 For a further discussion see Dunne, „After 9/11.” 
4 Quoted in Cori E. Dauber, „Implications of the Weinberger Doctrine for American Military 
Intervention in a Post-Desert Storm Age‟ in Colin McInnes and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), 
Dimensions of Western Military Intervention (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p.80.   The furthest 
Bush would go was to state that were another Rwanda to occur when he was President, he 
would seek to „encourage [the United Nations] to move.”  Quoted in Tom Farer, 
„Humanitarian Intervention after 9/11: legality and legitimacy‟ in Jeff Holzgreffe and Robert 
Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Legal, Political and Ethical Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2002). 
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Bush Administration would risk U.S. forces to save strangers in peril 
after having declared a state of national emergency following the attacks 
on September 11.  The President likened the threat posed by al Qaeda 
to the U.S. to that of Nazism.5.  This privileging of national interest over 
an ethic of human solidarity continues the trend in U.S. and Western 
policy during the last decade.  In the 1990s, the humanitarian impulse 
was not the dominating factor in any cases of armed intervention that 
placed the lives of military personnel at significant risk.6  There was 
considerable debate among academics and practitioners in the 1990s 
as to whether there is, or should be, a legal right of humanitarian 
intervention for individual states.  But the barrier to protecting 
endangered citizens in Rwanda and Bosnia was not the constraint of 
sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention.  It was the reluctance of 
states in Kofi A. Annan‟s words to „pay the human costs of 
intervention‟7 when they believed they had no significant interests at 
stake.  Based on this reading, September 11 merely serves to 
accentuate the political constraints on humanitarian intervention 
established in the last decade.    
The war against terrorism opens up an alternative moral 
possibility: military interventions could be used to promote both 
counter-terrorist and humanitarian objectives.  If what was lacking in 
the 1990s was a compelling security interest to motivate intervention in 
situations of humanitarian emergency, then does the threat posed by 
global terrorism supply the missing ingredient?  The case of al Qaeda‟s 
relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan suggests that terrorists will 
                                               
5
 See Text of Bush‟s speech to Congress, Los Angeles Times, 20 September 2001, 
www.latimes.com, downloaded on 4 November 2002 
6 This argument is made in Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
7
 Kofi A. Annan, Preventing War and Disaster: A Growing Global Challenge (1999 Annual 
Report on the Works of the Organization; New York, 1999), p.21 
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find secure havens in „failed states.”  Such states are defined by: a 
collapse of the civil government; an absence of law and order; gross and 
systematic human rights abuses; massive violations of international 
humanitarian law; and private militias and factions controlling the 
means of violence.8  Could military intervention aimed at wiping out 
terrorist groups in failed states also contribute to protecting their 
endangered populations?  To explore this question, this chapter focuses 
on the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.  Bush claimed that 
humanitarian goals would be accomplished at the same time as the 
defeat of al Qaeda and the Taliban when he launched „Operation 
Enduring Freedom‟ (OEF) on 7 October 2001. 
There is considerable controversy over the legality and the 
legitimacy of America‟s use of force in response to the attacks of 
September 11.  It is not my intention here to enter into this debate.9  
Rather, my purpose is to show the contradictions between U.S. 
humanitarian claims and the conduct of its intervention in Afghanistan.  
Crucially, I argue that there were (and are) alternative policies available 
that would have satisfied U.S. security interests whilst also protecting 
Afghan civilians from starvation and lawlessness.  The first section 
considers which criteria should be met for an intervention to count as 
humanitarian.  This revolves around the complex relationship between 
motives, justifications, means and outcomes. This framework is then 
applied to the case of Afghanistan.  The second part exposes the 
discrepancy between the altruistic protestations of the Bush 
Administration and the moral consequences of its military and political 
                                               
8 UK Ministry of Defence‟s Peace Support Operations Joint Warfare Publication (JWP 3-50), 
para 205. 
 
9
 For a good overview see Michael Byers, „Terror and the Future of International Law‟ in Ken 
Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.118-128. 
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strategy.  There is disagreement over how far interveners should take 
on a long-term responsibility for rebuilding failed states.  What is 
significant in this case is that the administration acknowledged an 
obligation to help the Afghan people rebuild a viable government.  
Living up to this pledge requires a prolonged political, economic and 
military commitment.  The final part of the chapter argues that whilst 
the U.S. and the wider international community have committed 
economic aid for general reconstruction, there has been a failure to 
provide the military forces necessary to the provision of effective 
security for the Afghan people.   
 
What counts as a legitimate humanitarian intervention? 
The generally accepted understanding of humanitarian intervention is 
defined by Wil Verwey as: „the threat or use of force by a state or 
states…for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious 
violation of fundamental human rights.”.”10 Similarly, Bhikhu Parekh 
considers humanitarian intervention as an act „wholly or primarily 
guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow feeling, and 
in that sense disinterested.”11  Intervention of this character is thus 
viewed as an act of great kindness in which a particular political 
community places the lives of its nationals at risk to save non-citizens 
in danger.  Richard Miller pushes this logic to its extreme when he 
suggests that it is “a form of altruism writ large, a kind of self-sacrificial 
love”12 that expresses our common humanity.  Outsiders should be 
totally other-regarding in their actions, to the point of giving up their 
                                               
10 Cited in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.43 (emphasis added). 
11 Bhikhu Parekh, „Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention‟, International Political Science 
Review, 18/1 (January 1997), p.54. 
12
 Richard B. Miller, „Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the Limits of Casuistry‟, 
Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol.28, No.1 (Spring 2000), p.17. 
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lives to protect fellow humans in need.  Few versions of humanitarian 
intervention would establish such a demanding requirement.  In effect, 
Miller‟s position requires soldiers to place the protection of civilians 
before any concerns about their own survival.  A more modest ethic 
would require soldiers to accept considerable risks to save non-citizens 
but still maintain the right to protect themselves.  Even this concession 
to a cosmopolitan morality challenges head-on the realist or statist 
conviction that military humanitarian intervention violates the compact 
between state and citizen; states have a primary obligation to protect 
their citizens from danger, including those who serve in the armed 
forces.13  Some realists would rule out any military humanitarian 
intervention on these grounds.  Others would accept that there is a 
responsibility to help those in need subject to this not challenging core 
security interests or imposing overly high costs on the intervening 
state‟s military personnel.  This concern with reducing the risks faced 
by soldiers sits very uneasily with Miller‟s notion that humanitarian 
intervention is an act of self-sacrifice.  Faced with these two extreme 
positions on the balance to be struck between self and other-regarding 
actions, the challenge is to find a strategy that protects civilians without 
exposing military personnel to excessive dangers.  Western states failed 
to achieve this balancing act in the 1990s.  It was the value of „force 
protection‟ that dominated the conduct of Western intervention, leading 
to a failure to act when civilians were at risk as in Bosnia and, most 
shockingly in Rwanda, where over 800,000 people perished in the 
genocide.   
                                               
13
 For an exploration of how humanitarian intervention challenges the postulates of the 
statist paradigm, see Parekh, „Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention.” 
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The West‟s failure to satisfy an ethic of humanitarianism in its 
interventions fuelled the long-standing suspicion of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention on the part of many Third World states.  In 
debates on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, spokespersons 
for Southern governments stress the importance of disinterestedness in 
a state‟s actions.  Ambassador Soliman Awaad, Egyptian Assistant 
Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs, maintains that the legitimacy of 
intervention depends upon “norms and criteria of humanitarian 
intervention…[being] indiscriminately applied to all cases without 
double standards or politicization.”14  Requiring an intervention to be 
exclusively motivated by ethical values sets too high a moral standard, 
and no action will satisfy such an ambition.  It is hardly surprising then 
that we find this position advanced by those governments that are 
opposed to legitimating a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
Moreover, it begs the question of how to judge whether an intervention 
is motivated purely by this consideration.  Individuals are often blind to 
the multiplicity of reasons that inform their actions.  Why should it be 
assumed that governments are any different?  Judging the publicly 
professed reasons against a state‟s subsequent actions is one test for 
gauging the validity of the rationales invoked for an action.  However, 
even if there is no discrepancy, this does not rule out the presence of 
other non-humanitarian motives. 
A less stringent requirement is that humanitarian motives be the 
primary but not exclusive reason for intervention.  This position was 
adopted in the 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which declares: „The primary 
                                               
14 Soliman Awaad, „Sovereignty and Intervention: The Legal Aspects‟ (Paper presented at the 
Conference on State Sovereignty in the 21st Century: „Concept, Relevance and Limits‟, New 
Delhi, 23–4 July 2001) p.4. 
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purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states 
may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering.”15  This viewpoint 
presupposes the legitimacy of non-humanitarian reasons when the 
moral imperative to rescue is the driving force behind action.  The ICISS 
suggests three possible sub-tests for assessing whether this criterion 
has been satisfied: the operation should be multilateral in character; it 
should have the support of other states in the region, and the 
intervention should be welcomed by those whom it is intended to help.16  
The difficulty with this formulation is that it provides no basis for 
distinguishing between strong and weak humanitarian motives.  
Comparing the gap between justifications and subsequent actions 
might alleviate the problem for if the humanitarian motive is weak or 
even non-existent, it might be expected that the demonstrated 
commitment to defending humanitarian values would be very limited. 
Making the primacy of motives the defining test of a legitimate 
humanitarian intervention excludes cases where states act for non-
humanitarian reasons but produce a positive humanitarian outcome.  
The best examples of this are India‟s intervention in East Pakistan in 
1971, Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 and 
Tanzania‟s intervention in Uganda in 1979.17  In each case, the use of 
force motivated primarily by concerns of self-defence led to the ending 
of human rights emergencies.  This leads Michael Walzer to argue 
“mixed motives are a practical advantage”18; in the absence of important 
security interests, neither India nor Tanzania (he does not mention 
                                               
15 The Responsibility to Protect (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001), 
p.xii. 
16 The Responsibility to Protect, p.36. 
17
 The three cases are discussed in detail in Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp.55-139. 
18 Michael Walzer, „The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention‟, Dissent, 49/1 (Winter 
2002), p.6, www.dissentmagazine.org/archive, visited on 7 March 2002. 
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Vietnam) would have intervened.  The ICISS argues that a good test of a 
state‟s humanitarian bona fides is the degree to which the victims 
welcome the intervention.  This argument breaks down in the case of 
Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia because the available evidence 
suggests that humanitarian concerns played little or no part in 
Vietnam‟s decision to intervene.19  Yet the Cambodian people initially 
viewed the action as one of liberation because it rescued them from the 
brutality of the Khmer Rouge.20  This was a case where self-defence was 
compatible with the rescue of the Cambodian people from what Mr 
Bouhdiba, Chairman of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention and 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, described as nothing less 
than „auto-genocide.”21  The humanitarian credentials of the 
Vietnamese action were tarnished by the subsequent human rights 
abuses of the government it installed to replace the Khmer Rouge.  But 
this does not alter the fact that Vietnam‟s actions in removing the Pol 
                                               
19 A humanitarian justification was explicitly rejected by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister as 
a legitimate basis for the use of force.  Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told Congressman 
Stephen Solarz that „human rights was not a question; that was their problem…We were 
concerned only with security.”  Quoted in Stephen A. Garrett, Doing Good and Doing well: 
An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p.120. For a 
detailed discussion of the Vietnamese intervention, see Gary Klintworth, Vietnam’s 
Intervention in Cambodia in International Law (Canberra: Australian National University, 
1984). 
 
20 Based on interviews with survivors of the Pol Pot regime, William Shawcross concluded 
that „the Vietnamese intervention had been a true liberation‟ (Quoted in Klintworth, 
Vietnam’s Intervention in International Law, p.65).  Further evidence for this claim is 
provided by Prince Sihanouk who said that the Cambodian people welcomed the Vietnamese 
as „saviours‟ (Cambodian Information Office Newsletter, May 1997, 19, quoted in Klintworth, 
Vietnam’s Intervention in International Law, p.65).  A seasoned observer of the region, Nayan 
Chanda, reflected that: In hundreds of Cambodian villages, the Vietnamese invasion was 
greeted with joy and disbelief.  The Khmer Rouge cadres and militia were gone.  People were 
free again to live as families, to go to bed without fearing the next day…it was as if salvation 
had come…One refrain that I heard constantly from the survivors was “If the Vietnamese 
hadn‟t come, we‟d all be dead” (Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy The War After the War (New 
York: Collier, 1986), p.370. 
 
21 Quoted in Klintworth, Vietnam’s Intervention in International Law, p.62. 
 10 
Pot regime provided an important measure of protection for the 
Cambodian people compared to the horrors they had just lived through. 
This case lends support to those like Fernando Teson who argue 
that the prominence accorded the motives of the intervenor is based on 
a flawed methodology.  He writes that unless the non-humanitarian 
reasons behind an action „have resulted in further oppression by the 
intervenors…they do not necessarily count against the morality of the 
intervention.  The true test is whether the intervention has put an end 
to human rights deprivations.  That is sufficient to meet the 
requirement of disinterestedness, even if there are other, non-
humanitarian reasons behind the intervention.”22  This argument is 
supported by Gary Klintworth, who argues that Vietnam‟s toppling of 
Pol Pot met „the criteria for an excusable humanitarian intervention, 
because „the net result of [the intervention] was to interrupt the killing 
that was underway inside Cambodia.”23  Building on Teson‟s work, I 
argued in Saving Strangers that motives should only disqualify an 
intervention as humanitarian if it could be shown that they had 
undermined the humanitarian success of the operation.  To satisfy the 
minimum or threshold requirements of a legitimate intervention, four 
criteria must be met: there must be a supreme emergency which I 
defined following Walzer as an act that „shock[s] the moral conscience of 
mankind‟; second, all credible avenues of peaceful redress must have 
been exhausted (the principle of last resort in the Just War tradition); 
third, the military means employed must be proportionate to the gravity 
of the human rights violations; and finally, there must be a positive 
humanitarian outcome defined as rescue (ending the humanitarian 
                                               
22 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs 
Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998), pp.106-107. 
23 Klintworth, Vietnam’s Intervention in International Law, p.76. 
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emergency in the short-term) and long-term protection (addressing the 
underlying political causes of the abuse of human rights).   
The last requirement is a particularly controversial one.  Parekh 
argues that humanitarian intervention should be distinguished from 
the delivery of aid to those in need.  The latter, he argues, is only 
concerned to relieve suffering; it does not address its underlying causes.  
It might be argued that satisfying this requirement establishes too 
demanding a test of humanitarian intervention.  Moreover, if this 
standard were widely accepted, it could have the effect of inhibiting 
states from engaging in such open-ended commitments.  This concern 
is reinforced by the worry that ambitious experiments in „nation 
building‟ aimed at addressing the root causes of gross human rights 
abuses would end in failure and a humiliating exit.  Are outsiders 
engaging in a dangerous kind of moral hubris in believing they can 
solve the problems of troubled war-torn societies like Kosovo, Somalia 
and Afghanistan?  Without ignoring the force of these arguments, or 
denying that armed rescue to end genocide or mass murder is morally 
preferable to inaction, this short-term conception of intervention is 
fatally flawed.  The problem is that once the intervening forces pull out, 
there would be little to prevent a return to conflict and violence within 
the society.  The challenge facing intervening states is to relieve the 
immediate suffering whilst taking on a long-term political, economic, 
social and military commitment to help local actors create a new law-
governed polity.  The ICISS called this the “responsibility to rebuild,” 
arguing that the long-term aim of “international actors…[is] „„to do 
themselves out of a job” by handing back responsibility to local elites.24  
To avoid the danger of intervention turning into a new imperialism or 
                                               
24 ICISS, p.45. 
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neo-colonialism, outside actors must, according to Parekh, „ensure that 
the structure [new government] is evolved by or in cooperation with the 
affected parties and not externally imposed.”25  The question that he 
does not answer is how interveners should respond if dominant power 
holders within the society forcibly resist the creation of new structures 
of legitimate authority that seek to marginalize their influence.   
Although Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia was widely 
condemned at the time as a breach of the sovereignty principle, I 
argued in Saving Strangers that it counts as humanitarian because 
there was a happy - if purely inadvertent - coincidence between 
motives, means and a positive humanitarian outcome.26  Vietnam did 
not consciously tailor its intervention to meet the goals of 
proportionality and long-term protection of human rights, and in this 
sense, its ending of „auto-genocide‟ inside Cambodia is best labelled a 
case of „inadvertent humanitarian intervention.”27  This can be 
contrasted with cases where an actor justifies the use of force by 
invoking humanitarian claims.  States that seek to occupy the moral 
high ground risk being exposed as hypocrites if they fail to meet this 
standard of behaviour.  American intervention in Afghanistan poses 
some difficult conceptual issues in this regard because there was no 
attempt by the administration to argue at the outset that it was 
                                               
25 Parekh, „Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention‟, pp.55-56.  This definition of a successful 
humanitarian intervention is also encapsulated in Teson‟s test as to whether it has „rescued 
the victims of oppression, and whether human rights have subsequently been restored.” See 
Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, p.106. 
 
26 This occurred in the Cambodian case because Vietnam‟s toppling of Pol Pot for exclusively 
national security reasons ended the tyranny of the Khmer Rouge over the Cambodian people.  Such 
a fortuitous result cannot be guaranteed in other cases.  I am grateful to Jack Donnelly for alerting 
me to the significance of this latter point.   
27
 I am grateful to Colin McInnes for suggesting this term.  The moral philosopher Peter 
French refers to cases where actions motivated by other reasons accidentally lead to good 
ends as „unintended good Samaritanship.”  Peter French (ed.), A World Without 
Responsibility (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1991), p.5.  I am grateful to Toni Erskine for 
bringing French‟s work to my attention. 
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motivated primarily by humanitarian reasons.  Nevertheless, there was 
a clear intention on the part of the Bush Administration to buttress 
political support for the action by partly defending the operation in 
these terms.  The remainder of the chapter examines how well U.S. 
political and military leaders lived up to these humanitarian claims.   
 
Humanitarian motives and means in Operation Enduring Freedom 
The plight of the Afghan people in the 1980s and 1990s is well 
documented; twenty years of civil war had destroyed any semblance of 
legitimate state institutions, with warlords28 ruling different parts of the 
country.  Through the 1990s, there was a growing toll of civilian 
casualties as a result of armed conflicts between the rival factions, and 
all parties to the civil war were responsible for gross violations of 
human rights.  Faced with such a desperate situation, 2.3 million 
people had sought refuge in neighbouring Iran since the early 1980s.29 
In 2000, international non-governmental human rights organisations 
and UN humanitarian relief agencies predicted an impending 
humanitarian catastrophe, exacerbated by the worst drought in 30 
years, placing 1.5 million Afghans at risk.  The Taliban‟s own brand of 
fanatical Islam compounded the suffering of women who found 
themselves virtually enslaved: they were denied basic education; an 
authoritarian dress code was imposed; and there was restricted access 
to medical care.30  The humanitarian emergency inside Afghanistan in 
                                               
28
 The term warlord is popularly evoked to describe the political make-up of failed states.  I 
am following the New Oxford Dictionary of English that defines a warlord as „a military 
commander, especially an aggressive regional commander with individual autonomy.” 
29 Briefing by the American Red Cross, 8 October 2001, 
http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/0109wtc/011008afghanaid.html, downloaded on 17 
March 2002. 
30 The litany of abuses is set out in the State Department‟s Report, „The Taliban's War 
Against Women‟, US Department of State International Information Programmes, 17 
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2000-2001 raises the question whether armed intervention was justified 
to protect a population in danger.  The Clinton Administration never 
seriously considered using U.S. forces to remove the Taliban.  Instead, 
it restricted itself to non-military coercive pressures by supporting the 
imposition of sanctions in the hope that this would induce the Kabul 
government to stop providing a safe haven for al Qaeda.  At the same 
time, the administration delivered humanitarian aid to alleviate the 
suffering of the Afghan people.  Indeed, the U.S. was the largest 
supplier of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in 2001.   
The atrocities inflicted on U.S. citizens by al Qaeda on September 
11 fundamentally changed calculations on intervention in Afghanistan.  
Bush declared the following objectives in launching OEF on 7 October 
2001: to attack al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military 
installations of the Taliban regime; to bring al Qaeda‟s leaders - 
crucially bin Laden - to justice; and to send a signal to other states that 
those harbouring terrorist groups risk similar attacks being visited on 
them.31  Yet from the outset of the campaign, the President also felt it 
necessary to justify the action in humanitarian terms.  He declared: 
 
The oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America and its allies.  As we strike military 
targets, we‟ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
November 2001, www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/rights/women/01111702.htm, downloaded 
on 16 March 2002. 
31 „President Bush announces military strikes in Afghanistan‟, 7 October 2001, US 
Department of State International Information Programmes, 
www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/terrorism/bush1007.htm, downloaded on 16 March 
2002. 
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starving and suffering men and women and children of 
Afghanistan.32 
 
Given Bush‟s publicly stated opposition to using the U.S. military for 
„soft‟ humanitarian purposes, the depth of his moral commitment 
should be called into question.  Conversely, it could be argued that the 
commitment to deliver humanitarian aid as part of the operation 
against al Qaeda and the Taliban was a logical development of the 
administration‟s pre-war role as the major aid donor to Afghanistan.33  
Trying to demonstrate Bush‟s sincerity --or lack of it--demonstrates the 
limits of relying solely on motives as the defining yardstick of legitimate 
intervention.  What matters is that the President felt it was necessary to 
publicly defend the action in humanitarian terms, an implicit admission 
that this justification was a necessary enabling condition of the action.  
The President recognised the importance of being seen to address the 
humanitarian crisis in bolstering international support for U.S. action, 
especially among public opinion in the Islamic world.  
Six weeks into the war, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Joseph J. Collins, repeated 
Bush‟s pledge that humanitarian assistance was an integral part of the 
Pentagon‟s military strategy.  He stated that „military actions have not 
slowed humanitarian assistance but rather…[it has been] possible to 
both fight successfully and to accelerate humanitarian assistance at the 
                                               
32 „President Bush announces military strikes in Afghanistan‟, 7 October 2001, US 
Department of State International Information Programmes, 
www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/terrorism/bush1007.htm, downloaded on 16 March 
2002. 
 
33 British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, reportedly had stressed to Bush his firm belief that counter-
terrorist goals should be pursued in conjunction with relief efforts.  Michael Evans, „Airstrikes may 
have to wait for aid airlift‟, The Times, www.thetimes.co.uk, downloaded on 20 May 2002. 
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same time.”34  Collins pointed to UN World Food Programme (WFP) 
deliveries of aid that reached record levels in October and November.  
Before OEF at least one and a half million Afghans were at risk from 
starvation.  Speaking at a State Department briefing on 3 January 
2002, Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator for the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), declared that this number had 
received assistance.  In reply to a question regarding the impact of the 
military operation on the delivery of aid, he claimed that the defeat of 
the Taliban in November had „made it possible for [humanitarian] 
operations to get back up [leading to] the success, the rapid success.”35  
The extent to which the need to publicly legitimate military operations 
as a contribution to relief efforts had become part of the language of 
U.S. military leaders can be seen in a press conference given by the 
Chief of U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks, on 18 
January 2002.  He claimed that the attack against the Taliban had 
gone hand-in-hand with a humanitarian relief operation that had saved 
thousands of lives and this was something Americans should be proud 
of.36   
This rosy picture of the humanitarian consequences of OEF 
differed sharply from the story told by non-governmental relief 
organisations (NGOs) operating inside the country.  The President of 
Médécins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Jean-Herve Bradol, reiterated the 
organisation‟s long-standing view that there was a fundamental 
                                               
34 Joseph J. Collins, „Special briefing on humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan‟, 
inserthttp://www.centcom.mil/news/press_briefings/Franks_18jan.htm, downloaded on 
19 March 2002. 
 
35 Andrew S. Natsios, Special Press Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, US 
Department of State, 3 January 2002, www.state.gov/p/sa/ris/rm/7027.htm, downloaded 
on 20 May 2002. 
36 Jim Garamone, „Humanitarian Success Story in Afghanistan‟, 
www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:11….:1521,00.htm, downloaded on 19 June 
2002. 
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contradiction between „shooting with one hand while offering aid with 
the other.”37  If aid is not perceived as entirely neutral, then there is a 
risk that those delivering it will be viewed as partisan and hence 
legitimate targets of war.  Ian Wallace, Operations Director of the UK 
relief organisation Tearfund, endorsed this view.  He stated that, “Food 
should not be used as a weapon of war…there is an inevitable conflict 
of interest between the political objectives of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the humanitarian principles of impartiality and 
neutrality.”38 The U.S. airdropped hundreds of thousands of packets of 
food aid, but aid workers dismissed this as a propaganda stunt.  The 
action was aimed at winning the favour of the Afghan people, which aid 
agencies recognized as a political, and not a humanitarian, objective.  
MSF officials contended that the food drops were so minor and poorly 
targeted in relation to the needs of the people that they were far 
outweighed by the negative effects of the bombing.39  Moreover, there is 
evidence that the aid packets had adverse humanitarian consequences: 
civilians were killed on occasions when packages hit them or their 
homes; the vulnerable and weak were the least able to take advantage 
of such drops; and many Afghans were afraid to approach the rations 
packets, which were the same color as the U.S. Air Force‟s cluster bomb 
casings.40  Those humanitarian NGOs that opposed the U.S. military 
                                               
37 Quoted in Jonathan Chait, „Look who‟s against dropping food‟, The New Republic, 5 
November 2001, www.thenewrepublic.com/110501/chait110501.html, downloaded on 23 
March 2002. 
38
 Quoted in Keith Ewing, „Tearfund: safe areas for Afghanistan better than air-drops‟, 
Reuters, www.alertnet.org/thenews/from the field/300678, 12 October 2001, downloaded 
on 20 March 2002. 
39 See interview with Austen Davis, General-Director of MSF Holland, 15 October 2001, 
http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=6305A703-EB70-4F41-
8A0E25ED5F24969E, downloaded on 22 March 2002. 
40 Stephen Castle, „Humanitarian air drops criticised after US aid kills women in her home‟, 
The Independent, www.independent.co.uk, 30 November 2001, downloaded on 20 May 
2002; Andrew Gumbel, The Independent, www.independent.co.uk, downloaded on 20 May 
2002, Nathan Ford, „Afghanistan – humanitarian aid and military intervention don‟t mix‟, 
Médécins Sans Frontieres web site, 7 November 2001, 
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intervention called upon all sides in the conflict to create a neutral 
humanitarian space within which the UN‟s World Food Programme 
(WFP) and relief organisations could safely deliver food.  Exposing the 
„humanitarian cover‟ employed by the U.S. as a sham, the President of 
Médécins de Monde, Claude Moncorgé, argued that this 
““humanitarian” label‟” should not be given “to strategies, 
interests…and options decided by a military staff in function of the 
interests of the state that employs them.”41 These views reflect the 
strong antipathy among many aid agencies to the idea that force can 
support humanitarian objectives.   
The NGOs‟ prescription to create a neutral humanitarian space 
overlooked the fact that it was the difficulty of securing consent from 
the warring parties that had contributed to a worsening of the 
humanitarian situation in 2001-2002.  Moreover, the criticism that 
association with the U.S. military would compromise humanitarian 
relief efforts was founded on a misunderstanding as to the role that the 
military was playing.  Because of concerns that relief convoys with U.S. 
military protection would become targets, USAID had recommended 
that the military not be used for the specific delivery of aid.  This 
decision was justified on the basis of U.S. experience in Bosnia where 
“The convoys that had no military protection had a higher delivery rate 
than those with military protection.”42  This decision makes an 
important concession to those in the humanitarian aid community who 
worry that military intervention jeopardises their neutrality whilst also 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=6A534F6C-233B-46AE-
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41 Claude Moncorgé, „Humanitarianism doesn‟t rhyme with military‟, Liberation, 
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42 Andrew S. Natsios, Special Press Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, US 
Department of State, 3 January 2002, www.state.gov/p/sa/ris/rm/7027.htm, downloaded 
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recognising that force is sometimes necessary to create a secure 
environment in which such operations can take place.   
While the available evidence points to a significant increase in 
humanitarian aid reaching Afghans by January 2002, the short-term 
effect of the bombing campaign was the significant undermining of 
existing relief efforts.  It was not until late November that adequate 
supplies of relief aid were reaching the country, the fall of the Taliban 
and Bush‟s decision to give a further $325 million in aid being key 
factors in this.  With the demise of the Taliban, UN international staff 
and NGOs who had left the country owing to the lack of security 
returned, and local drivers were now prepared to deliver aid to areas 
where previously there had been fighting.  Nevertheless, it took a couple 
of months to reach most of those who needed help.  It is estimated that 
during this period there was a 40% reduction in aid deliveries.43  Carl 
Conetta, who has undertaken an authoritative study of the 
humanitarian consequences of the U.S. bombing campaign, estimates 
that the number of internally displaced persons increased by 
approximately 360,000; 200,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, and 
a minimum of 3,000 Afghans died as a result of the disruption to aid 
deliveries.44  The latter could be a conservative figure as much depends 
upon how the disruption of aid impacted on already very high mortality 
rates in central, Northern and Western Afghanistan.  On a worst-case 
basis, Conetta estimates that it could have been as many as 20,000, 
whilst Jonathan Steel suggests that the figure could be as high as 
                                               
43 Jonathan Steele, „Forgotten Victims‟, The Guardian, 20 May 2002. 
44 Carl Conetta, „Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and 
the Afghanistan war‟, Project on Defense Alternatives, 30 January 2002, 
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49,600.45  These estimates are, of course, counterfactual, as no one 
knows how many Afghans would have died had the bombing not taken 
place.46   
Any assessment of the humanitarian results of OEF has to take 
into account not only the indirect effects of the bombing but also its 
direct impact on Afghan civilians.  The Pentagon has released no official 
figures for civilian casualties, but Conetta claims in a separate study 
that the bombing killed 1,000-3,000 innocent Afghans.47  The Pentagon 
made considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties, and Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfeld declared, “I can‟t imagine there‟s been a 
conflict in history where there has been less collateral damage, less 
unintended consequences.”48  There is evidence that air strikes were 
called off due to concerns about civilian casualties.  Nevertheless, there 
are also grounds for arguing that the U.S. did not exercise sufficient 
care in targeting residential areas where it suspected al Qaeda and 
Taliban personnel were hiding.  Likewise, it can be argued that the U.S. 
did not make sufficient effort to ensure that the intelligence it received 
from local regional commanders was accurate before launching air 
                                               
45 These figures are arrived at by estimating the mortality rate among internally displaced 
persons based on a comparable figure with the death rate in the refugee camps.  This in 
turn is contrasted with the mortality rate before the bombing took place.  For a fuller 
discussion see Conetta, „Strange Victory‟ and Steele, „Forgotten Victims‟, The Guardian, 20 
May 2002. 
46 Jonathan Steele, „Forgotten Victims‟, The Guardian, 20 May 2002. 
47 Carl Conetta, „Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing 
Casualties‟, Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Report#11, 24 January 2002, p.3 
www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html, downloaded on 25 January 2002, p.3.  The most 
controversial assessment of the number of civilian casualties was provided by Marc W. 
Herold in December 2001.  See Marc Herold, „Afghan killing fields‟, letter to The Guardian, 
13 February 2002.  For his full report see Marc W. Herold, „A Dossier on Civilian Victims of 
United States‟ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting‟, 3 December 
2001.  A report by Associated Press dated 11 February 2002 and based on eyewitness 
accounts claimed that the casualty figure did not exceed a 1,000.  See Deb Riechmann, 
„Hundreds lost, not thousands‟, Associated Press, 11 February 2002, 
www.msnbc.com/news/704903.asp?cp1=1, downloaded on 15 May 2002. 
 
48 Cited in William Arkin, „Fear of civilian deaths may have undermined effort‟, Los Angeles 
Times, 16 January 2002, www.latimes.co, downloaded on 16 January 2002.   
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strikes.  The inadvertent but foreseeable killing of Afghan civilians as a 
consequence of U.S. strikes rested very uneasily with Bush‟s claim that 
the use of force was aimed at the Taliban and al Qaeda and not at the 
Afghan people.49  As one of the anti-Taliban commanders whose forces 
were central to the battle in December against al Qaeda in the Tora 
Bora Mountains, lamented: 
 
Why are they hitting civilians?  This is very bad.  Hundreds have 
been killed and injured.  It is like a crime against humanity.  
Aren‟t we human?50 
 
One of the horrific realities of war is that it is impossible to provide total 
immunity to civilians.  The ethical question raised by U.S. conduct of 
OEF is whether American military personnel should have accepted 
greater risks in order to better protect innocent civilians.   
Was there a more humane means of intervention that would also 
have met the vital U.S. security interest in defeating al Qaeda?  Conneta 
argues that OEF should not have been launched until the regional 
military commanders had reached a firm consensus on the political 
framework for a post-Taliban government.51  The United Front that 
included the Tajik based „Northern Alliance‟ (dominated by the Panshiri 
faction of the Shura-I-Nazar) and the Uzbek forces of General Abdul 
Rashid Dostrum were the backbone of the anti-Taliban resistance.  Any 
new political order had to accommodate this grouping but the key to 
building a new legitimate government depended upon ensuring that 
other ethnic groups – crucially the majority Pashtun community - were 
                                               
49 For a discussion of the ethical issues raised by US targeting policy, see Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, „Dying for „Enduring Freedom‟: Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in 
the War against Terrorism‟, International Relations Vol.16, No.2 (forthcoming 2002). 
50 Quoted in Conetta, „Strange Victory‟, p.21. 
51 Conetta, „Strange Victory‟, pp.27-31. 
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brought into the governing process.  The best means of achieving this 
would have been the rapid deployment of a force of at least 30,000 
troops to come in behind the United Front as it routed Taliban forces.52  
Such a force mandated under Chapter VII could have facilitated 
humanitarian relief efforts; reduced the risks of banditry; disarmed any 
warlords who challenged the agreed structure of political authority; and 
helped train a new national army and police force.  Even in the absence 
of an agreement on a new political framework, the deployment of a 
robust international force would have facilitated relief efforts and helped 
establish a secure environment.53  This operation would not have 
precluded U.S. Special Force attacks against al Qaeda and Taliban 
personnel, including the use of limited air power.54  However, it would 
have reduced the number of direct and indirect civilian casualties that 
occurred as a consequence of the bombing campaign.  The Bush 
Administration opposed such a deployment for three reasons: first, it 
viewed this type of operation as a distraction from the central task of 
defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda; second, it worried that its forces 
would suffer higher casualties than would be the case with an air 
campaign; and third, it did not want to get sucked into a protracted 
ground commitment. 
The bombing campaign clearly exacerbated the humanitarian 
crisis in the short-term.  Nevertheless, it could be argued that in 
removing the Taliban from power, the U.S. opened the door to the 
possibility of a new and more humane order in Afghanistan.55  The key 
issue is whether the U.S. and the wider international community are 
exploiting this new opportunity to improve human rights or whether 
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Afghanistan is slipping off the map of moral concern, as with the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces in the late 1980s. 
 
The ‘Responsibility to Rebuild’ 
Having started down the path of intervention in Afghanistan and 
having, confined the humanitarian component to the delivery of aid, the 
Bush Administration found that it was not so easy to limit U.S. 
humanitarian responsibilities.  In several speeches during 2002 
administration officials expanded the moral justifications behind their 
intervention to encompass the rebuilding of Afghanistan as a law-
governed state.56  In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 
2002, Rumsfeld asserted in response to a question of what had been 
won through the war: “Well, I think…number one [is] the fact that the 
Taliban no longer are the governing factor in that country.  And in that 
sense, the people of Afghanistan have, in a significant way, been 
liberated from the policies and the repressive actions of the Taliban 
government”.”57  U.S. officials were quick to point to expressions of this 
“liberation,” such as the freedom of women not to wear the traditional 
burqa (though many are continuing to do so) and the return of girls and 
women to education.  Speaking on 17 April 2002 at the Virginia Military 
Institute, the President emphasized the U.S. responsibility to help the 
people of Afghanistan.  Invoking the vision of George Marshall and his 
successful plan that rebuilt Western Europe, Bush stated: “We know 
                                                                                                                                                   
55 Jonathan Chait, „Look who‟s against dropping food‟, The New Republic, 5 November 2001, 
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that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people 
the means to achieve their own aspirations…peace will be achieved by 
helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government…By helping to 
build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil [the Taliban] and is a 
better place in which to live.”58  Although a very small sum in 
comparison with the 3.8 billion dollars spent on the war against al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. committed U.S.$297 million as part of 
a three-year U.S.$4.5 billion package of international aid agreed at the 
Afghan donor conference in Tokyo in January 2002.  Two months later, 
the House International Relations Committee voted to further American 
aid through a package of U.S.$1,100 million over a four-year period.59  
In addition, the U.S. continues to be the highest donor of emergency aid 
to Afghanistan.  This is a vital contribution given the UN‟s estimate in 
March 2002 that „millions of people will need food aid to survive until 
mid-2003.”60 
There was (and is) a fundamental flaw in the Bush 
Administration‟s thinking about rebuilding Afghanistan.  It has not 
recognised that long-term success depends upon a robust international 
military commitment to establishing peace and security.  Without a 
replacement of „rule by Kalashnikov‟61 with the rule of law, there is no 
prospect of long-term security for Afghans.  Representatives of the 
different factions met in Bonn in December 2001 and agreed to the 
                                               
58 „President outlines war effort‟, Remarks by the President to the George C. Marshall ROTC 
Award Seminar on National Security‟, 17 April 2002, 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002, downloaded on 20 May 2002. 
59 „Powell calls for Reconstruction in Afghanistan‟, International Information Programmes, 
www.usinfo.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0424pwl.htm, 24 April 2002, downloaded 
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downloaded on 25 May 2002. 
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establishment of an interim central government headed by Hamid 
Karzai.  They also agreed as part of the negotiations to the deployment 
of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help stabilise the 
situation.  The Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 on 20 
December 2001 establishing under Chapter VII a seventeen-nation 
force led by the UK comprising 4,500 troops.  Its mandate was to assist 
the interim government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its 
surrounding areas.  The force is not charged with a peacekeeping role 
in the classic sense of the term because it has the authority „to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.”62  Central authority is very 
weak and Karzai‟s writ barely extends beyond Kabul where ISAF 
protects him and his administration.63  The dominant political force in 
the government is the Tajiks who control the Defence and Interior 
Ministries.  The Pashtuns resent the influence wielded by the Tajiks, as 
do the Uzbek and Hazara militias who dominate the North East.  A 
major flashpoint occurred in the summer of 2002 when the Tajik 
general Ostad Atta Muhammed clashed with the Uzbek commander 
Dostrum over control of Mazar-I-Sharif.64  This pattern of regional 
military commanders competing for power and influence is repeated 
across large parts of the country.65 
Recognising that his authority depended upon an expansion of 
ISAF nationwide, Karzai requested this in January 2002.66  UN officials 
                                               
62 Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 December 2002. 
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from the Secretary-General down supported such a development.  On 
27 March, the UN‟s Special Representative on human rights in 
Afghanistan in his report to the Human Rights Commission stated: “The 
first priority in restoring human rights is security…how do you start the 
rule of law after the rule of the gun for so many years?”67  In calling for 
the deployment of more troops across Afghanistan, Mr. Hossain 
reflected that “never has so much been at stake if a modest request for 
10,000 to 20,000 international security forces is not urgently and 
immediately made available.”68  The U.S. based NGO Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) supported this pessimistic evaluation.  Based on 
fieldwork in the country, it produced a report on 6 May 2002 that 
documented a climate of chronic insecurity in which ethnic minorities 
and women were especially vulnerable.69  In a press release issued a 
day later, Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of HRW, declared, „If the 
international community doesn‟t take more effective steps immediately 
to establish security throughout Afghanistan, the country is likely to 
return to the rampant human rights abuses and warlordism that 
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characterised the last decade.”70  The disparity between Bush‟s promise 
to help Afghan civilians live in dignity and the cruelty and abuses 
depicted by HRW could not be starker. 
 The U.S. is not oblivious to the need to provide security, but there 
was a debate within the administration during 2002 over how best to do 
this.  On one side of the argument were the civilian leaders in the 
Pentagon who argued strongly against any direct participation of U.S. 
forces in ISAF, or any expansion of the force beyond Kabul.  America 
contributes logistic and intelligence support, and is committed to 
helping evacuate ISAF in the event of an emergency.  A key reason for 
the Pentagon‟s opposition to an expansion of ISAF is that this would 
make any such operation far more dangerous.  Second, it was believed 
that an enlargement of ISAF would impair U.S. search and destroy 
operations against residual al Qaeda forces.  Third, an ISAF with a 
mandate to protect civilians would have to be prepared to challenge the 
power of the regional warlords, and the Secretary of Defence was not 
persuaded that this was a mission worth risking the lives of U.S. 
soldiers for.  Finally, Rumsfeld had his eye on the larger war against 
terrorism and did not want U.S. forces tied up in Afghanistan when 
they could be needed to fight Iraq.  Set against this position was the 
State Department, which argued that without an expansion of ISAF, 
there would be no long-term stability in Afghanistan.   
Rumsfeld wanted the Afghans to take responsibility for their own 
security, and this position prevailed within the administration.  The 
U.S. commitment to restoring law and order consisted of providing 
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funds for the training of a new national army and police force.71  And in 
the interim whilst this is being created, the administration has assigned 
small teams of Special Forces to keep the peace between the regional 
commanders and build up support for the central government.  The 
problem is that the U.S. relies on local warlords to provide the 
intelligence to track down residual pockets of al Qaeda, and they want 
weapons and money in exchange for this.  However, strengthening 
these warlords in the southern and eastern parts of the country is 
inimical to the task of building new state institutions because these 
Pashtun commanders resent the influence wielded by the Tajiks in the 
new government.72  The contradiction at the heart of U.S. post-war 
planning is that given the discontent felt by Pashtuns towards the 
central government, it is going to be very difficult to create a multi-
ethnic national army.  The Defence Minister, General Mohammed 
Fahim (leader of the „Northern Alliance) is viewed with great suspicion 
by the other military commanders who perceive his plans to build a 
national army as a cover for consolidating the power of the Tajiks in 
government.  And whilst the other warlords feel threatened by Fahim, 
they are unlikely to agree to demobilise their forces.73   
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The Bush Administration‟s decision to accommodate the regional 
warlords rather than contribute to an expanded ISAF stemmed from 
fears of becoming trapped in an Afghan quagmire.  It also rested on a 
profound misunderstanding of what went wrong in Somalia.  The belief 
is that „Operation Restore Hope‟ initiated by George Bush Senior in 
December 1992 succeeded because the U.S. worked with the militia 
leaders.  Conversely, the UN operation that replaced the U.S. led force 
failed because it embarked on the process of disarmament with 
disastrous results.  This interpretation overlooks the fact that the 
mandate given by the Security Council to UNOSOM II in March 1993 
was crucial because it aimed to strip the militias of their power and 
create the space for a civilian leadership to emerge.74  The problem was 
that the UN force that replaced the Americans was too weak to 
challenge the power of the warlords.  What U.S. officials fail to see is 
that the initial intervention was flawed because it failed to put in place 
structures for the long-term maintenance of the rule of law in Somali 
society.  It is ironic that the current administration is repeating exactly 
the same error in Afghanistan.75  To succeed in Afghanistan where the 
UN failed in Somalia, it is vital that ISAF be expanded to the major 
cities; display a readiness to use force against any factions violently 
opposing its mission; be equipped for combat operations with effective 
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air support; the process of disarmament be applied in an impartial 
manner; any use of force respect the laws of war; have the widest 
possible backing among the different ethnic groups in Afghan society; 
operations exhibit cultural sensitivity; and that interveners not exit at 
the first sign of serious trouble.   
By late summer of 2002, it was apparent that opposition to a 
limited expansion of ISAF was softening among Pentagon hard-liners.  
As the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and pressure 
mounted within the Congress for a stronger international security 
presence, the administration indicated that it was prepared to support 
a modest expansion of the international force.  Joseph Biden and 
Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spearheaded 
a bi-partisan effort in early August 2002 that resulted in a bill urging 
Bush to expand ISAF, authorizing U.S.$1 billion to this end.76  The 
concern among members of the Committee was that a failure by the 
U.S. to provide effective security could lead to a renewal of civil war, 
necessitating a more costly American intervention to rectify the 
situation.  In an interview with the Daily Telegraph on 21 August 2002, 
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence, gave voice to the shift in 
administration thinking: „I think there are some benefits that could 
come from using ISAF in ways outside of the capital, not necessarily as 
a permanent presence but as a way of providing some transitional 
security in places where it's needed‟.77  Some ideas being considered 
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involved creating a mobile group of peacekeepers that could deployed to 
trouble spots and placing forces in cities where there are tensions 
between rival warlords as in Mazar-I-Sharif.78  One important 
motivation behind the change of heart on the part of senior Pentagon 
officials was that improved security might allow U.S. troops to be 
redeployed if needed against Iraq.79   
The extent of this shift should not be exaggerated since there was 
still no question of American troops being committed to ISAF.  And in 
the absence of this, it is extremely unlikely that other states will be 
prepared to volunteer the necessary forces.  The continuing reluctance 
of the Bush Administration to join ISAF is crippling efforts at rebuilding 
a viable civic authority in Afghanistan.  U.S. officials have expressed 
frustration at the slowness with which the 4.5 billion of aid pledged at 
Tokyo has been reaching Afghans.  Aid is significant in boosting the 
authority of the central government, and in providing combatants with 
incentives to lay down their arms and return to civilian life.  Indeed, 
economic development offers the best long-term hope of persuading 
people to abandon the patronage of the warlords.  However, as many 
critics of the administration have pointed out, the prerequisite for this 
process of political and economic reconstruction is greater security.  In 
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the absence of this, as Mike Jendrzejczyk of HRW points out, there will 
be no „re-emergence of Afghan civil society, and [no establishment of 
the] legal and administrative institutions to protect the rights of all 
Afghans‟.80  This is why a major expansion of ISAF led by the U.S. 
remains crucial if Bush is to live up to his promise to leave Afghanistan 
better than he found it 81      
In addition to its moral responsibilities to the Afghan people, the 
U.S. has a compelling security interest in making Afghanistan a 
success.  In response to the charge that U.S. policies risk a return to 
civil war – with the possibility that a new hostile government could 
come to power –supporters of the administration reply that no future 
Afghan government would defy the U.S. having seen what its military 
power did to the Taliban.82  If this viewpoint describes official thinking, 
then it highlights the marginal role that humanitarian concerns play in 
administration policy.  But even in it‟s own terms, this conception of 
security is myopic and self-defeating; it fails to locate the war in 
Afghanistan as part of a larger struggle for hearts and minds in the 
Islamic world.  After promising to help Afghans live in dignity, the U.S. 
will further erode what support it enjoys among Muslims if it is 
perceived as merely seeking its own interests in Afghanistan.  The effect 
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being to further radicalise Muslim opinion against U.S. interests and 
values.83  The problem is that this threat to U.S. security is intangible 
to policy makers compared with the immediate costs and hazards of 
taking on a robust peace enforcement role inside Afghanistan. 
 
Conclusion 
Just as Vietnam would not have launched its intervention without a 
compelling threat to national security, the U.S. only used force against 
the Taliban because of the attacks on September 11.  The fact that 
national interest was the primary motivating factor should not 
automatically disqualify OEF as a humanitarian intervention.  As I 
argued in relation to the Vietnamese action, the key test is whether 
non-humanitarian motives prevent an intervention from satisfying – 
however accidentally – the criteria of proportionality and a positive 
humanitarian outcome (presupposing that the other two criteria I 
identified have also been satisfied).  Endorsement of OEF as a case of 
„inadvertent humanitarian intervention” has come from Walzer, a 
prominent member of the liberal left in U.S. politics.  He suggests that 
“the Taliban regime had been the biggest obstacle to any serious effort 
to address the looming humanitarian crisis, and it was the American 
war that removed the obstacle. It looked (almost) like a war of 
liberation, a humanitarian intervention.”84  There are two basic 
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problems with this position.  First, it exaggerates the success of OEF in 
humanitarian terms; second, it overlooks the fact that U.S. policy 
makers explicitly defended the use of force on humanitarian grounds.  
It is important to differentiate between cases where a humanitarian 
outcome is an unintended by-product of an intervention (Vietnam‟s 
intervention in Cambodia) and those where governments publicly 
establish a normative benchmark with which to judge the results of an 
intervention.  By laying claim to the moral high ground in the hope of 
winning over domestic and world public opinion, the Bush 
Administration exposed itself to such an assessment.  I have argued 
that measured against this yardstick, the U.S. action fails as a 
humanitarian intervention.  The Bush Administration‟s refusal to lead 
on ISAF expansion is the best example of its failure to match words 
with deeds.  The reluctance of the U.S. to accept the risks to its military 
personnel that would be required by a long-term commitment to protect 
Afghans is indicative of the minor role that humanitarian 
considerations played in the decision to act.  This supports Roberto 
Belloni‟s contention that “If motives are largely non-humanitarian, then 
it is unlikely that the intervening states would be involved in any way in 
a post-war transition, because the principles that led to the intervention 
are only superficially altruistic.”85  The implication of this is that if 
humanitarian intervention is defined – as I have argued it should be - in 
terms of a „responsibility to rebuild‟, it will be rare to find a 
correspondence between non-humanitarian motives and a positive 
humanitarian outcome.   
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 The U.S. intervention, like that of the Vietnamese, was primarily 
justified as self-defence.  But the fundamental change in legitimating 
principles in international society in the intervening two decades also 
enabled the U.S. to utilize humanitarian arguments.  During the Cold 
War, this line-of-defence had not been available to policy makers 
because human rights imperatives were firmly subordinated to the 
principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and the non-use of force.  
The best example of a state being constrained from raising 
humanitarian claims during the Cold War was Tanzania‟s intervention 
to topple the government of Idi Amin in 1979.  Despite being moved to 
act by humanitarian concerns, there is every reason to think that 
without the prior Ugandan attack against Tanzanian territory, President 
Julius Nyerere would not have acted.  He acknowledged in several 
speeches at the time that humanitarian intervention was not a 
legitimate basis for the use of force against another sovereign state.86  
However, as a consequence of the inroads that human rights made into 
the principle of sovereignty during the 1990s, a new norm of 
intervention has developed supporting the use of force to protect 
civilians from genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing.  This norm 
is strongest among Western states, which have been the key players 
through the 1990s in establishing this new principle in international 
society.  The extent to which the language of humanitarianism has 
become a legitimating ground for US intervention can be seen in the 
fact that despite being primarily motivated by vital security interests, 
the administration felt the need to invoke a humanitarian rationale 
alongside that of self-defence. 
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There are two opposing interpretations of this increasing reliance 
on humanitarian justifications.  One is that if governments are required 
to defend the use of force on these grounds, this will inhibit them from 
acting in ways that directly contradict the stated moral purposes.  The 
argument for this „constraining effect‟ is that governments - even the 
most powerful - do not want to be exposed as hypocrites.  This creates a 
need to ensure conformity between legitimating reasons and 
subsequent actions.  Alternatively, there are those who argue that this 
belief in the power of norms underestimates the capacity of states to 
manipulate the discourse of humanitarianism to serve their own ends.87  
The case of American intervention in Afghanistan suggests that the 
critics are right to caution against investing too much confidence in the 
constraining effect of humanitarian norms.  Before September 11, 
opponents of U.S. foreign policy were anxious that the discourse of 
humanitarianism would enable the U.S. to intervene at will.  American 
policy in Afghanistan will have done nothing to mollify this concern.88  
Although there has been criticism of U.S. policy from members of the 
Congress, the media, academics and the wider human rights 
community, an effective opposition capable of holding the 
administration accountable for its actions has not developed. 
Does this mean that humanitarian norms cannot function to 
inhibit the single superpower?  Such a conclusion is too sweeping since 
there are two contextual factors that might be adduced as to why this 
constraint failed to exert much influence in this case.  The first is that 
most Americans were fixated on the atrocities committed by al Qaeda 
and the continuing threat posed by terrorism.  As a result, they did not 
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feel a strong sense of solidarity with the plight of Afghan strangers.  The 
second explanation is that public opinion simply did not recognise an 
inconsistency between the administration‟s words and its deeds.  
Walzer suggests that effective opposition to U.S. policy has been 
“politically disarmed” by “pictures of [Afghan] women showing their 
smiling faces to the world, of men shaving their beards, of girls in 
school.”89  As I have argued, these manifestations of progressive change 
are predominantly restricted to Kabul where ISAF operates.  For many 
Afghan civilians, their daily lot remains one of fear, insecurity and a 
struggle for survival.  Unfortunately, this picture of Afghan life painted 
by human rights NGOs and other informed commentators failed to 
capture the moral imagination of millions of Americans. Strengthening 
the inhibiting effect of humanitarian norms on future U.S. policy 
depends upon establishing a public sphere in which American citizens 
are mobilised to demand the inclusion of humanitarian values in 
foreign policy.  In the absence of this, the danger is that U.S. policy 
makers come to believe that they can use force without legal or moral 
censure provided they couple this with a token humanitarianism that 
will nullify dissent at home.90   
There are two fundamentally different approaches to viewing the 
relationship between humanitarian intervention and self-defence in the 
war against terrorism.  The first is the model of „direct self-defence‟ 
where military strategy is aimed at defeating the capabilities of selected 
terrorist groups, or states that are sponsors and/or perpetrators of 
terrorism.  The motivation for intervention would be the protection of 
vital national interests and the threat of danger is both compelling and 
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immediate.  The challenge facing those committed to human rights is to 
mobilise domestic and international public opinion to ensure that 
humanitarian aims are factored into military planning.  The Bush 
Administration did not deny this responsibility in relation to 
Afghanistan, but it failed to back up its moral claims with an effective 
strategy for civilian protection.  An important task for those who believe 
that violent humanitarianism is not a contradiction in terms is to show 
that there were alternative military strategies that could have met both 
counter-terrorist and humanitarian goals.   
Even if future operations of direct defence are conducted with 
greater regard for their humanitarian impact, the nexus between 
human rights and self-defence offers no prospect of humanitarian 
intervention in cases where there is no direct threat to national 
security.  It was the lack of a compelling security rationale that led UN 
Member States to abandon the people of Rwanda to their fate in 1994.  
Unless a future genocide posed a clear threat to prospective interveners, 
reliance on direct defence would provide no basis for rescue.  The latter 
can be contrasted with what Miller calls “indirect self-defence” where 
states recognise a general interest in preventing the spread of violence 
and oppression on a global scale.91  The danger to our security is not 
immediate as in the case of direct defence, but if injustice and violence 
are allowed to flourish in distant places, the result will be an erosion of 
restraints against violence everywhere.  Had such an argument shaped 
Western policy towards Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the country 
might never have become a sanctuary for bin Laden and al Qaeda.  
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What September 11 showed was not only the terrible moral 
consequences that can flow from allowing states to collapse into 
violence and disorder, but also the indivisibility of security on a global 
scale.  Writing before the terrorist attacks against New York and 
Washington, Miller contended that „indirect self-defence‟ was flawed as 
a motivation for humanitarian intervention because states that are less 
vulnerable to the effects of distant violence have no incentive to act.  
Conversely, those that have most to gain from containing the escalation 
of conflict might be least capable of acting.92  Miller is right that 
„indirect self-defence‟ has not served to persuade citizens in the West to 
sacrifice for strangers, but it does not follow from this that it is flawed 
as a moral basis for humanitarian intervention.  The thrust behind 
indirect defence is the price of inaction only manifests itself over the 
longer term.  This is the argument that Western governments should 
have made to their publics when confronted with the genocide in 
Rwanda. 
In his speech to the Labour Party conference in October 2001, 
Tony Blair asserted that the international community would have a 
compelling „moral duty‟ to stop another genocide like the Rwandan 
one.93  He was keen to identify his support for Bush‟s war against 
terrorism as part of a wider moral agenda of internationalism.  But his 
promise that future genocides would not be ignored begs the question 
of whether an ethic of human solidarity can be developed to realise this 
project.  The story of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s points to 
the triumph of particularist moral attachments over universalist ones.  
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Western publics have sympathised with those in need and they have 
often been quite generous in donating aid, but their governments have 
steadfastly refused to pay the human costs necessary for effective 
intervention.  The failure of Western states - crucially the U.S. - to take 
a leadership role over ISAF expansion does nothing to suggest that this 
basic moral proclivity has changed. 
The Bush Administration failed to seize the opportunity in 
Afghanistan, but September 11 opens the door to interventions that 
protect both U.S. security and humanitarian values.  Yet at a deeper 
level, the war against terrorism has not affected the struggle between a 
realist ethic that seeks to limit risks to interveners and one of common 
humanity that believes military personnel should be placed in danger to 
protect fellow humans in peril.  It is the outcome of this moral battle 
and not September 11 that will determine the future of humanitarian 
intervention. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
